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O
n the occasion of his most recent visit to Bonn, World Bank President McNamara based his deliberations on the 0.7 p.c. target. Also the Ministry for Economic Cooperation recently more than once stressed the intention of not relaxing the efforts towards reaching this target. But still, the public aid performances of the majority of industrial countries fall, in some cases considerably, behind the target set for 1975. The DAC countries, providing among them more than 95 p.c. of all countries' public development aid, in 1970 reached a share of only 0.34 p.c. of the GNP with their public aid performances. In 1971 it amounted to 0.35 p.c.
Subdivided according to individual countries, the Federal Republic of Germany fell below the DAC averages in both years (1970:0.32 and 1971: 0.34 p.c) . Such an important donor country as the USA shows even lower values at 0.31 and 0.32 p.c., respectively. Therefore the Federal Republic as compared with the USA is by no means playing the role of an outsider (see Table 1 ).
Past Development
But Germany stands out, in a negative sense, inasmuch as its share of public aid has in the last 5 years gone down .in percentage of the GNP. In 1968 it amounted to 0.41 p.c. but in 1972 it was merely 0.31 p.c. in spite of repeated warnings of the importance of adequate public development aid for the realisation of the targets set for the Second Development Decade (see Table 2 ). This, however, does not mean that Germany's efforts have been relaxed in absolute terms. In 1970 German public aid was DM 2.20 bn. net, and the respective figures for 1971 and 1972 were DM 2.56 and 2.60 bn. In the last 2 years the GNP went up by 21 p.c. whereas, during the same * HWWA |nstitut for Wirtschaftsforschung (The Hamburg Institute for International Economics). period, German public aid increased by 18 p.c. In former years this gap had even been wider because, regardless of substantial absolute increases, public development aid simply could not keep in step with the growth of the GNP.
But last year, according to provisional figures, also the absolute increase of public development aid by 1.56 p.c. was extremely small compared with the previous year. There is, however, no lack of assurances by the responsible Ministry that the absolute figures as well as the share of public aid in the GNP will in 1973 once again show marked increases. The relatively unfavourable picture of 1972 is explained by the Ministry in the main with technical difficulties, which, in turn, stemmed from the belated passing of the Federal budget by Parliament. This delay, according to State Secretary MatthGfer, led to the situation that aid already approved could in fact not be expended at the time envisaged. All the same, though, even if the technical difficulties can be overcome, it would still have to be said that the structure of public development aid gives reason to judge the future trend with caution.
Unfavourable Structure
Public development aid consists of bilateral and multilateral performances, according to the nature of each transaction. In 1972, of the total of German public aid of DM 2.60 bn. net, 75 p.c. represented bilateral performances, and 25 p.c. were multilateral ones. In bilateral aid itself one must distinguish between non-repayable grants (such as technical aid) and repayable loans and credits.
The share of grants was, in 1972, 41 p.c. of total gross performances, and that of loans and credits amounted to 59 p.c. It must be added that a growing part of the loan and credit aid flows back to the Federal Republic of Germany in the form of interest and amortisation payments. In 1972 there was, against an increase of the gross credit aid by 15 p.c., an increase of the backflow by 29 p.c. One-third of credits extended, therefore, flowed back as payments for debt servicing. The net amount of credit development aid thus was DM 960 mn., an increase over the previous year by 9.6 p.c. Thereagainst, grants went up by only one p.c., from 973 to 985 mn. DM (see Table 3 ).
Whereas non-repayable bilateral aid performances by the public sector were only a little higher, there even was a setback in the case of multilateral grants and credits; the latter being given at relatively favourable terms. In 1971, DM 715 mn. were given through multilateral institutions, but in 1972 this sum dwindled to DM 667 ran.
It follows that last year the consolidation of development aid could be secured more or less solely by aid which has relatively unfavourable consequences for the LDCs. This stands out at once when looking at the substantially higher backflow for the purpose of debt service.
Aid Conditions
It must be born i.n mind, however, that one credit is just not like another. In spite of the structural shifting of public aid in favour of the extending of means in the form of credits, it does not necessarily follow from this that the result was an additional burden for the LDCs. The size of a burden depends in each case on the conditions at which credits are given. During last year the Federal Republic succeeded in improving the conditions for bilateral aid: the duration of the contracts was extended from 29.6 years in 1971 to 31.3 years, the amortisation-free period lengthened by one year from eight to 9 years, and the average rate of interest reduced from 2.69 to 2.18 p.c. All the same, though, the conditions of the past, will continue for the time being to have the affect for the LDCs of a burden, and for Germany, on the other hand, of a guarantee for an increasing backflow. In as far as this trend might create difficulties for the LDCs becomes at once apparent when taking a mere glimpse at the past pattern of projects of Germany's bilateral capital aid for the LDCs.
Of the DM 15.4 bn. that were put at the LDCs' disposal up to the end of 1972, 11.8 bn. were project-linked aid, and further aid to the amount of DM 1.2 bn. could not be defined according to project ranges. Of the remaining DM 10 bn. plus, 6.6 bn. were infrastructure projects and DM 2.5 bn. "directly productive" ones. The amortisation of infrastructure projects is as a rule spread over a very long period of time because of their relatively high rate of capital investment, and in the case of directly productive projects the initial cost is relatively high; these projects can only rarely carry the burden of infrastructure aid performances as well. The question therefore remains open whether Germany's relatively favourable credit terms will, seen from the angle of the utilisation of credits, in the end lead to a higher burden upon the LDCs.
Regional Differences
This question cannot be answered for all LDCs generally. A sub-division by regions makes it clear that the circumstances are very different: In Africa, infrastructure projects amounted to DM 2.1 bn., whereas the sum of directly productive projects was DM 0.3 bn., pointing at a relatively low level of development, in Asia there were infrastructure projects to the tune of DM 2.9 bn.
and directly productive ones in the sum of DM 1.8 bn. In accordance with these interrelations between the two kinds of projects, and the different level of productivity possibly coupled to them, the credit conditions ought to be regionally differentiated.
In 
Other Public Performances
Looking at the present state and the development of German public aid, such performances that resemble public aid as such must not be left out of sight altogether, although there is of course every justification for the existence of a border line between the two.
First of all, "other public performances" must be taken into consideration aside public development aid proper. The former consist, for instance, of credits given by the Kreditanstalt fL~r Wiederaufbau (Reconstruction Loan Corporation) including means provided for purposes of debt consolidation. There are in addition also loans and credits extended by other public and semi-public bodies. Although these "other public 
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